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Status Offenses and the Status of Children's 
Rights: Do Children Have the Legal Right To Be 
Incorrigible? 
Comment* 
Supreme Court decisions1 and a constitutional amendment2 
have recently modified the legal status of children. Changes in 
that status, however, need not be conspicuous to be effective. 
Shifts in the policies of state agencies, coupled with judicial ac- 
quiescence, may just as effectively modify the de facto legal sta- 
tus of children without any observable de jure change. The use 
by state agencies and courts of conventional legal doctrines to 
reach unconventional results may, upon analysis, reveal that 
such a change is taking place. 
Juvenile law is especially amenable to significant, yet incon- 
spicuous, change. Juvenile court judges have long been vested 
with broad procedural and dispositional di~cretion;~ moreover, 
extensive informal involvement between troubled families and 
state agencies associated with the juvenile court frequently pre- 
cedes or replaces formal court action. Thus, not only judges, but 
also nonjudicial state officials and employees have a strong im- 
pact in molding the legal status of minors. 
- 
* This comment originated in the research done for the article by Professor Bruce C. 
Hafen appearing in this issue, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism-Some 
Reservations about Abandoning Youth to their "Rights. " The Review gratefully acknowl- 
edges the assistance and contributions of Professor Hafen. 
1. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (suffrage extended to those 18 years and older). 
3. This discretion has been noted by both courts and scholars: 
[The juvenile] court is rightly vested with a broad range of discretion in light 
of its professional expertise. The essence of expertise and discretion is an in- 
formed choice between alternatives. When the expert discretion of the Juvenile 
Court is exercised with knowledge of the salient facts, its exercise of discretion 
will not be disturbed absent clear abuse. 
United States v. Tate, 466 F.2d 432,434 (D.C. Cir. 1972), quoting Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 
106, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
The most striking characteristic of children's law is the large degree of 
discretion permitted decision-makers in enforcing community norms. When in- 
terventions must occur, bureaucratic discretion replaces familial discretion. The 
statutes authorizing state intervention implicitly accept that the state's repre- 
sentative will know what children need and should not be straight-jacketed by 
legal technicalities. 
Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487,490 (1973). The broad range 
of dispositional alternatives is illustrated by UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-100 (1953), which 
allows the juvenile court to order any one of 17 dispositions. 
660 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
This comment uses as an illustration of the potential for this 
kind of change the case of In re Snyder.' Snyder does not involve 
a flagrant abuse of discretion by a juvenile court judge or, argu- 
ably, a deliberate change in the law by an appellate court. 
Rather, i t  presents challenging legal and practical problems that 
demonstrate the need for a clear understanding of the policies 
tha t  should guide state agencies and juvenile and appellate 
courts in the formidable task of readjusting the legal relation- 
ships between children, their parents, and the state. Snyder 
raises significant questions and may portend an important trend 
in the law of children's rights. 
I. In re Snyder 
In June 1973, Paul Snyder took his 15-year-old daughter, 
Cynthia, to the Youth Service Center of the local juvenile court. 
Cynthia had rebelled against her parents' restrictions on her 
smoking, dating, and other activities. She was temporarily placed 
in a "receiving home," her father expecting that after a short stay 
she would be returned to the family home. 
In July, in an attempt to avoid returning home, Cynthia filed 
a petition through a caseworker associated with the county juve- 
nile court alleging that because of the unfitness of her parents she 
was a "dependent child," and therefore a "ward of the courtY5 
Pending a hearing on her petition, Cynthia was placed in a foster 
home for 3 months. At a hearing in October, a juvenile court 
commissioner found no parental unfitness under the statutory 
standards and concluded that he was without jurisdiction in the 
case. Cynthia returned home and remained until mid-November, 
when she left home and returned to the Youth Service Center. 
At her request, a second petition was filed by an officer of the 
Center, alleging that she was "in~orrigible"~ and should therefore 
4. 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975). 
5. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 9  13.04.010(2)-(3) (1962) confers Juvenile Court jurisdic- 
tion over any child under age 18 
(2) Who has no parent, guardian or other responsible person; or who has no 
parent or guardian willing to exercise, or capable of exercising, proper parental 
control; or 
(3) Whose home by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity of his parents or 
either of them, or on the part of his guardian or on the part of the person in 
whose custody or care he may be, or for any other reason, is an unfit place for 
such child . . . . 
6. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 13.04.010(7) (1962) provides that a child under 18 is 
"dependent" if the child "is incorrigible; that is . . . beyond the control and power of his 
parents, guardian, or custodian by reason of the conduct or nature of said child . . . ." 
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be placed in a foster home. At hearings conducted 3 weeks later, 
the juvenile court found Cynthia incorrigible and, after a 1-week 
continuance, ordered that she be placed in a foster home under 
the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court.' Seeking to re- 
gain custody, Mr. and Mrs. Snyder filed a motion for revision of 
the order. The motion was denied by the Superior Court in Au- 
gust 1974. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington unani- 
mously affirmed the decisions of the lower  court^.^ 
Snyder raises two broad questions that bring into focus im- 
portant aspects of the law of children's rights. First, is the result 
reached in Snyder congruent with the traditional purposes and 
policies of relevant juvenile law? Second, if Snyder represents a 
departure from normal practice or policy, what are its implica- 
tions for the law of children's rights? 
11. Snyder IN LIGHT OF EXISTING JUVENILE LAW 
The most conspicuous aspect of Snyder is the alignment of 
the parties: state and child us. parents. This raises the question 
of what conditions should exist before the state will intervene in 
a family conflict on the side of a minor child and take custody 
against the wishes of natural parents who have been found legally 
fit.' Under the facts, Snyder might have been considered under 
either of two categories of juvenile law statutes in current use: 
(1) early emancipation, or (2) status offenseslO-especially incor- 
rigibility and runaway provisions. The question to be kept in 
mind is whether statutes in either category would normally yield 
the result reached in Snyder-an indefinite termination by the 
state of parental custody a t  the request of a minor child who is 
objecting to parental discipline. If not, the case may well reflect 
an increased state deference to juvenile lifestyle preferences. 
7. The commissioner originally intended to have Cynthia return home. However, 
upon hearing the opinions of the counseling psychiatrist after the 1-week continuance, the 
commissioner decided to place Cynthia in a foster home. 
8. In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975). 
9. The classic case for such intervention, the neglected, abused, or dependent child, 
is clearly inapplicable to Snyder. In the first action filed by Cynthia, the Juvenile Court 
found that Mr. and Mrs. Snyder were not unfit parents and that Cynthia was therefore 
not a dependent child. 
10. As used in this article, "status offenses" refers to such uniquely juvenile offenses 
as truancy, running away, incorrigibility or ungovernability, and curfew violation. A sta- 
tus offender is sometimes referred to as a nondelinquent; such a child is "the truant, the 
runaway, the incorrigible, the unmanageable child, the loiterer, the curfew violator; he is 
caught drinking, 'associates with immoral persons,' is found in 'a situation dangerous to 
the morals of himself or others.' " P. Wald, The Changing World of Juvenile Law-New 
Vistas for the Nondelinquent child-~lternatives to Formal Juvenile Court Adjudication, 
40 PA. B .  ASS'N Q.  37 (1968). 
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A. Status Offenses 
An evaluation of Snyder in light of traditional juvenile status 
offense laws requires analysis of two issues. The first is whether 
Cynthia's conduct fell within the statutory definition of incorrigi- 
bility applicable in her case or met the requirements of other 
related statutes that might have been applied. The second is 
whether the result is consistent with the policies underlying juve- 
nile status offense statutes. 
I .  Incorrigi b les 
Under the Washington Code, an incorrigible child is one who 
is "beyond the control and power of his parents, guardian, or 
custodian by reason of the. conduct or nature of said child."ll 
Although Washington case law defining more precisely the kind 
of conduct that constitutes incorrigibility is limited, the accepted 
view in most jurisdictions is that a pattern of misconduct by a 
child is necessary to sustain a finding of incorrigibility; a single 
act of disobedience or even of criminal conduct has been held 
insufficient.12 That this requirement of repeated misconduct was 
considered applicable in Washington is evidenced by the refer- 
ence of the state supreme court in Snyder to "a pattern of refusing 
to obey her parents."13 
11. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 4 13.04.010(7) (1962). It  appears that in Washington, as 
in other jurisdictions, it is not necessary to establish fault in either the parent or the child 
so long as an actual lack of control creates a serious risk of harm. See In re Snyder, 85 
Wash. 2d 182, , 532 P.2d 278, 281 (1975); cf. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3- 
801(e) (Supp. 1975): 
"Child in need of supervision" is a child who needs guidance, treatment, or 
rehabilitation because . . . (2) [h]e is habitually disobedient, ungovernable 
and beyond the control of the person having custody of him without substantial 
fault on the part of that person . . . . 
12. See, e.g., Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928); In re V., 34 App. Div. 
2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dep't 1970); In re O., 31 N.Y.2d 730,290 N.E.2d 145,338 
N.Y.S.2d 105 (1972); In re Hooke, 95 Vt. 497, 115 A. 730 (1922). 
13. 85 Wash. 2d a t ,  532 P.2d at 281. 
It is significant that Washington itself, in Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 
P.2d 1096 (1975), appears to have relied upon the "pattern" requirement in successfully 
defending the constitutionality of the statute. Brief for Petitioners at 11, In re Snyder, 85 
Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975). In Blondheim, the court indicated that, although 
incorrigibility is commonly referred to as "status," it requires "conduct or a pattern of 
behavior proscribed by the statute." 84 Wash. 2d at 880, 529 P.2d at 1101. Somewhat 
ambiguously, the court also seems to suggest, in language echoing Washington's incorrigi- 
bility statute, that incorrigibility may arise from either the "conduct or nature of the 
child." ~ d . ;  cf., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 13.04.010(7) (1962). It is difficult to see how 
the "nature" of a child could be such as to make him incorrigible, absent an actual pattern 
of conduct or behavior. Basing a finding of incorrigiblity on stated intentions rather than 
6591 STATUS OFFENSES AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 663 
The testimony in Snyder did not reveal a typical pattern of 
disobedience. While Cynthia remained home, she was generally 
obedient.14 Her most conspicuous act of disobedience was that she 
left home the day before she appeared a t  the Youth Service Cen- 
ter.15 In light of standard policy for dealing with runaways,16 i t  is 
doubtful that a single instance of running away would normally 
be sufficient to constitute incorrigibility.The juvenile court com- 
missioner conceded that the case for incorrigibility was question- 
able: 
I am inclined to think, from what evidence has been pre- 
sented to the Court, that there is some question as to whether 
this matter meets the test of incorrigibility in its traditional 
sense. Indeed there are some elements that are incompatible, a t  
least with traditional notions of incorrigibility, school records, 
lack of contact with law enforcement agencies, lack of any de- 
viant behavior other than perhaps some smoking in violation of 
parental rules, things of a rather minor nature.'' 
The commissioner's further comments demonstrate tha t  the 
grounds for his finding were more pragmatic than legal: 
actual conduct seems especially risky in a family dispute where tempers flare easily and 
threats are often made that are not, in fact, carried out. See text accompanying notes 101- 
102 infra. 
14. Although evidence as to the extent Cynthia had disobeyed certain rules was 
conflicting, it was admitted that she had conformed, albeit resentfully, to the general 
demands of her parents: 
The state does not take issue with the implicit (if not express) assertion by 
petitioners that Nell and Paul Snyder are able to physically control Cynthia. 
When she is in the home, she does not smoke and she does not date. 
Brief of State Respondent at  10, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Brief of State Respondent]. 
15. The Supreme Court of Washington paints a rather vivid picture of the conflict 
in the Snyder home: 
The record shows that as Cynthia entered her teen years, a hostility began to 
develop between herself and her parents. This environment within the family 
home worsened due to a total breakdown in the lines of communication between 
Cynthia and her parents. . . . These hostilities culminated in a total collapse 
of the parent-child relationship. 
85 Wash. 2d a t ,  532 P.2d at  279. 
It cannot be denied that the Snyder family faced a difficult problem, but the state of 
affairs existing between the times of the parental unfitness hearing and the incorrigibility 
hearing, note 14 supra, and a general heading of the record of the incorrigibility hearing, 
Record, vol. 1, Statement of Facts, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182, 532 P.2d 278 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Record], suggest that such phrases as "a total collapse of the parent- 
child relationship" may be somewhat exaggerated. Significantly, the court went outside 
the record in looking for evidence of Cynthia's incorrigibility. Note 127 infra. The observa- 
tions of the juvenile court commissioner discussed in the text accompanying notes 17 and 
18 infra give, perhaps, a more objective picture of the basis for the incorrigibility finding. 
16. See note 28 and accompanying text infra. 
17. Record at  78. 
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I do find that Cynthia is incorrigible, despite some very compel- 
ling indications to the contrary as we view it in a traditional 
sense. I say that because of her announced intention and appar- 
ent resolve not to go home and because of what seems to me to 
be a lack of consideration on the part of the parents as to what 
we are all going to do if she really acts on that resolve.18 
It was not Cnythia's absence for one day, but rather her resolve 
not to remain a t  home that formed the basis of the commis- 
sioner's finding. This was not evidence of past misconduct, how- 
ever, but instead pointed to possible future behavior. If Cnythia's 
statement that she was unwilling to remain at home was credible, 
it seems likely that a true runaway or incorrigibility case could 
have soon developed. But it must also be remembered that the 
Snyden had been successful in controlling their daughterlg and 
were asserting that if the juvenile court personnel would refrain 
from giving her encouragement and they could con- 
tinue to exercise that control successfully. Thus, while the Snyder 
family problem was serious, it had not yet developed into a case 
of traditional incorrigibility .21 
Snyder is an anomalous incorrigibility case because the child 
initiated the proceeding and the state gave her full support. 
Usually, when incorrigibility or ungovernability is involved, the 
parent or guardian initiates or cooperates in state initiation of the 
action alleging in~orrigibility.~~ The state then steps in to rein- 
force or assume parental authority. In Snyder, rather than being 
disciplined for uncontrollable conduct, it appears that Cynthia 
successfully invoked the power of the state as a means of avoiding 
the custody of her parents and establishing her personal lifestyle 
preference. 
Incorrigibility and ungovernability statutes do not require an 
admission by the parents of loss of control before an affirmative 
- 
18. Record at 81. 
19. Note 14 supra. 
20. Mr. Snyder believed that Cnythia's decision to seek assistance from the juvenile 
court was directly attributable to the encouragement she received from state social work- 
ers. Record at 63-64. 
21. For a discussion of the dangers of premature intervention by the courts in family 
disputes see text accompanying notes 98-100 infra. 
22. In New York, for example, parents or their surrogates initiate 59 percent of PINS 
(see notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra) petitions, which often are based on incorri- 
gible behavior by the child; school officials bring 25 percent of the petitions; unrelated 
individuals, such as the police, bring the remaining 16 percent. Note, Ungouernubility: 
The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383,1385 1111.20-21 (1974). In some cases both 
parent and child have opposed an allegation of incorrigibility. See Kahm v. People, 83 
Colo. 300, 264 P. 718 (1928). But Snyder is the rare, and perhaps unique, case where the 
child and the state sided against the parents. 
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finding of incorrigibility can be made. Indeed, although such par- 
ental admissions are the rule rather than the e x c e p t i ~ n , ~ ~  such a 
requirement could allow the obstinance of a parent to prevail over 
convincing evidence of incorrigibility. But in a case like Snyder, 
where there has not been a pattern of misconduct, but rather a 
"lack of any deviant behavior other than . . . things of a rather 
minor nature,"24 where parents who have been found legally fit 
are actively asserting their ability to control their child, and 
where the incorrigibility finding is admittedly based on the 
child's "announced intention and apparent resolve not to go 
home" and on "a lack of consideration on the part of the par- 
e n t ~ , " ~ ~  the circumstances suggest that a valid case for statutory 
incorrigibility has not been made. Although a self-imposed claim 
of incorrigibility makes a teenager's preference clear, enforcing 
even well-documented juvenile preferences has hardly been the 
objective of incorrigibility law. 
2. Runaways 
Although Washington has no statute dealing specifically 
with runaways," some states expressly extend the reach of their 
status offense provisions to include them.27 It is the act of leaving 
home, rather than the pattern of disobedience and misconduct, 
that gives the juvenile court jurisdiction over the child. Had such 
a provision been available, Snyder might well have been litigated 
in that context, since Cynthia had left home without her parents' 
permission. 
The runaway analogy, however, is only partially applicable, 
since Snyder is distinct from the typical runaway case. When 
parental fitness is not a t  issue, the state's well-established policy 
23. Since parents initiate most incorrigibility proceedings, note 22 supra, it is self- 
evident that they generally do not contest the allegations that the child is beyond their 
control. 
24. Record a t  78. 
25. Id. a t  81. 
26. Washington is, however, a party to the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, which 
provides for the return of runaways from another state. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 13.24.010, 
art. IV (1962). 
The statute normally used to handle runaways in King County is WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. 5 13.04.010(2) (1962), which grants jurisdiction over a child with "no parent or 
guardian willing to exercise, or capable of exercising, proper parental control." Telephone 
conversations with officer of King County Juvenile Court, Nov. 14, 1975. In Snyder, 
however, this provision was not available because the parents had successfully resisted it 
only a few weeks earlier. A second proceeding under the same provision could have been 
defeated by the doctrine of res judicata. 
27. E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. 5 43-23-3(g) (1972). 
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is to exhaust every possible means of returning runaway children 
to their homes.28 
The state in Snyder seems to have taken quite the opposite 
approach by declaring its intent to support Cynthia against her 
parents. The state made it clear before the trial that if Cynthia 
decided not to return home, it would attempt to retain custody 
rather than consent to her parents' demand that their daughter 
be returned to them.29 Although the disposition of the case (state 
custody of a runaway child) may not be unique, the pretrial han- 
dling of the matter by the state distinguishes it from the policies 
and practices regularly associated with runaway child cases." 
3. Children's rights and status offenses generally 
Perhaps more important than a comparison of the Snyder 
facts with the typical patterns in incorrigibility and runaway 
cases is an examination of the general legislative history and 
broad policies of status offenses and what they reveal about the 
rights of children vis-a-vis their parents. 
Children's rights questions may be viewed with respect to 
three general categories of juvenile law: juvenile delinquency, 
parental fitness, and status offenses. Juvenile delinquency typi- 
cally involves criminal code violations by minors,31 where the 
state-child relationship is central to both the offense and the 
l i t i ga t i~n .~~  Parental fitness laws deal with neglected, abandoned, 
28. This policy was unanimously stated by officers from juvenile courts in California, 
Utah, and Washington in telephone interviews during November 1975. To this end, coun- 
seling programs and "crisis centers" to reconcile parents and children and return children 
to their families have been established in San Francisco and Alameda Counties, Califor- 
nia, and elsewhere. This policy is also expressed in the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, 
in which many states have joined. It provides: 
That the parent, guardian, person, or agency entitled to legal custody of a 
juvenile who has not been adjudged delinquent but who has run away without 
the consent of such parent, guardian, person or agency may petition the appro- 
priate court in the demanding state for the issuance of a requisition for his 
return. 
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 13.24.010, art. IV (1962). 
29. Deposition of Margaret Rozmyn at 7-8. The King County Juvenile Court indi- 
cates that it seldom resorts to the incorrigibility provision in dealing with runaways. Its 
decision to do so in this case may be explained by the unavailability of the statutory 
provision usually used. See note 26 supra. 
30. Moreover, if by going voluntarily and directly to the juvenile authorities Cynthia 
was manifesting a hope or expectation of state assistance against her parents' discipline, 
perhaps she had actually run "to" rather than run "away" in the conventional sense. 
31. In addition, juvenile delinquency statutes sometimes prohibit specific acts for 
juveniles but not for adults: for example, statutes regulating possession of alcohol by 
minors. 
32. The parent-child relationship may also be involved in various ways, such as in 
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or abused children. In these, the parent-child relationship is a t  
issue, but the child's rights are limited to the receipt of such 
fundamentals as the physical necessities of life, freedom from 
physical injury, and basic super~ision~~-care so essential that it 
is outside the realm of parental discretion. The category to which 
Snyder belongs includes status offenses such as incorrigibility, 
running away, and truancy.34 Status offense statutes require an 
the right of the child to his parents' presence in court proceedings, the possible liability 
of the parent for the conduct of his child, and the role of the parent in the disposition of 
the case of a child found to be delinquent. 
33. E.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT 5 1012(e) (McKinney 1975), which defines an "abused 
child" as one whose parent or legal guardian 
(i) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon such child physical injury by other 
than accidental means which causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or 
serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or 
emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
organ, or 
(ii) creates or allows to be created a substantial risk of physical injury to such 
child by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death or 
serious or protracted disfigurement, or protracted impairment of physical or 
emotional health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily 
organ, or 
(iii) commits, or allows to be committed, a sex offense against such child as 
defined in the penal law, provided, however, that the corroboration require- 
ments contained therein shall not apply to proceedings under this article. 
A "neglected child" is defined at id. § 1012(f) as one less than 18 years of age 
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in 
imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent 
or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of 
care 
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or 
education in accordance with the provisions of part one of article 
sixty-five of the education law, or medical, dental, optometrical or 
surgical care, though financially able to do so or offered financial or 
other reasonable means to do so; or 
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, 
by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a sub- 
stantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal pun- 
ishment; or by using a drug or drugs; or by using alcoholic beverages 
to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or by any other 
acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court; or 
(ii) w h ~  has been abandoned by his parents or other person legally responsible 
for his care. 
34. The proscribed behavior is variously defined as "behaving in an incorrigible . . . 
manner," ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 2552 (1964), being "habitually disobedient, 
ungovernable, and beyond the control of the person having custody," MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-801(f)(2) (1974), or repeatedly disobeying "the reasonable and lawful 
commands of [one's] parents, guardian, or other custodian," MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
5 712A.2(a)(2) (Supp. 1975). Related provisions grant juvenile court jurisdiction over a 
child "[wlho has deserted his home without sufficient cause," id., or who is an habitual 
truant, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 5 2552 (1964), or a drug addict, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 
37, § 702-3(c) (1973). Unlike delinquency cases, there need be no violation of criminal law. 
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inquiry into the parent-child relationship, focusing on the child's 
willingness to submit to parental demands that do not constitute 
abuse or otherwise evidence unfitness. This categorization of ju- 
venile law is useful because it makes clear that Snyder deals with 
that part of the parent-child relationship that has traditionally 
fallen within the realm of parental discretion. 
The history of status offense law reveals two intertwined 
strands of policy: punishment and rehabilitation. These policies 
involve either reinforcing or finding substitutes for parental au- 
thority when such authority is found insufficient to control a child 
properly. The kinds of problems involved in status offenses were 
originally dealt with by the criminal law of some 
states35-disobedient children could be punished by the state 
when parental discipline was insufficient. With the advent of the 
juvenile law movement at the beginning of this century, many 
states combined both delinquency and status offenses under the 
single heading of juvenile delinquency law.36 A major purpose of 
the movement was to substitute the rehabilitative objectives of 
the parens patriae philosophy for the direct punishment of the 
criminal law. As was expressly recognized in In re G ~ u l t ~ ~  and 
related United States Supreme Court decisions,38 however, a 
penal element was inherent in juvenile delinquency proceedings 
that could result in commitment to state institutions, and guar- 
antees of procedural due process were therefore required. Thus, 
it was acknowledged that while the state was ostensibly attempt- 
ing to rehabilitate and reform juvenile delinquents (who often 
included incorrigibile children and other status offenders), it had 
not, in fact, ceased to punish them. In any event, the conduct of 
a child falling under status offense definitions was officially la- 
beled as "delinquent," a title scarcely suggesting an intent to 
secure the rights of a child against his or her parents. 
35. The first statutes were explicitly penal in nature. As early as 1646, the Puritans 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony enacted a statute allowing capital punishment for a 
"stubborn or rebellious son of sufficient years of understanding, viz. sixteen; which will 
not obey the voice of his father or the voice of his mother." 1 CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN 
AMERICA 38 (R. Bremner ed. 1970). The punishment was reduced to whipping in 1654. 
Katz & Schroeder, Disobeying a Father's Voice: A Comment on Commonwealth v. 
Brasher, 57 MASS. L.Q. 43 (1972). Until 1973, Massachusetts penal law continued to 
provide for fine andlor imprisonment for "stubborn children" and "runaways." MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 53 (1970), as amended, ch. 272, § 53 (Supp. 1975). 
36. For examples of states including incorrigible children within the definition of 
delinquency see ALA. CODE tit. 13, 8 350(3) (1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 17-53(c) 
(Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(7) (1974). 
37. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
38. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
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Many state juvenile laws have recently been overhauled to 
distinguish clearly between delinquency and status offenses and 
to deal more appropriately with the latter category. Recent stat- 
utes creating a distinct category for status offenses have com- 
monly used the terms "Persons in Need of Supervision" (PINS) 
or "Children in Need of Supervision" (CHINS).3g 
PINS and CHINS laws purport to deal only with children 
who are not abused, neglected, or delinquent, but who are "other- 
wise in need of [court] supervi~ion"~~ for reasons such as disobe- 
dience to parents, truancy, and drug addiction. Such statutes are 
also commonly the source of jurisdiction over runaways, even 
when running away is not part of the statutory lang~age.~' 
PINS and related statutes have been severely criticized in 
recent literature. The main thrust of this criticism is that, despite 
all the rhetoric about protection and rehabilitation, the statutes 
are inevitably penal in nature.42 Further attacks on the statutes 
39. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT $8 711 & 712 (McKinney 1975); MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-801(e) (Supp. 1975). Procedures applicable to status offense provisions 
are thought to be exempt from Gault-type restrictions. Stiller & Elder, PINS-A Concept 
in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33, 39 (1974). 
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (1973). A renewed attempt to make the'original 
parens patriae philosophy of the juvenile court work with status offenders is reflected in 
extensive pretrial procedures, see Comment, The Consent Decree and New York Family 
Court Procedure in "JD" and "PINS" Cases, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1211, 1214-17 (1972), 
and in requirements that minors institutionalized under PINS statutes must be kept 
separate from juvenile delinquents, see, e.g., In re C., 32 N.Y.2d 588,300 N.E.2d 424, 347 
N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973) (prohibiting the incarceration of PINS in training schools for juvenile 
delinquents). 
41. For example, California's "beyond-control" provision, CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE 
$ 601 (West 1972) is used to obtain jurisdiction over runaways. Telephone interview with 
officer of San Francisco County Juvenile Court, Nov. 14, 1975. 
42. Some commentators fail to see why such laws should escape the effects of Su- 
preme Court cases since the possibility of incarceration, the touchstone in Gault for 
providing due process guarantees, is also present in PINS dispositions. 
In Gault, 387 U.S. a t  27-28, the Court stated: 
Ultimately, however, we confront the reality of that portion of the Juvenile 
Court process with which we deal in this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. 
The boy is committed to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty 
for years. It  is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical mean- 
ing-that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial 
School. . . . 
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require 
the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase "due 
process." 
For typical PINS statutes allowing the possibility of incarceration see D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-2320 (1973); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 625 & 730 (West 1972); N.Y. FAMILY CT. 
ACT § 754 (McKinney 1975). 
Typical arguments for due process guarantees based on Gault are raised in Stiller & 
Elder, supra note 39, a t  42-51; 
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find a denial of equal protection or claim that the provisions are 
void for vagueness.43 Others question the wisdom of the statutes 
on the ground that the state is unable to benefit those who fall 
within the statutory jurisdiction." Finally, some are critical of the 
way in which PINS-type statutes allow parents to wield the club 
of state discipline over their children." Much of this criticism has 
merit-even from a point of view that generally considers the 
reinforcement of parental authority to be in the best interests of 
children .46 
The important point to be made from this criticism is that 
it has never been suggested that PINS-type statutes, which repre- 
sent the most recent and comprehensive attempts to isolate and 
deal with the problems of status offenders, were ever intended to 
undermine parental authority, whether that authority is exer- 
cised by the parent or by the state standing in loco parentis. 
Clearly, it is contrary to the history and purpose of juvenile law 
statutes dealing with status offenders to use the statutes as vehi- 
cles for allowing minors to avoid rather than be subject to non- 
abusive (although strict) discipline by fit (although imperfect) 
parents. The policy of the states toward minors falling under 
Note, The Dilemma of the "Uniquely Juvenile" Offender, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
386, 391-408 (1972). 
43. See Stiller & Elder, supra note 39, a t  42-51; Roybal, Void for Vagueness: State 
Statutes Proscribing Conduct Only for a Juvenile, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (1973). A 
extension of the equal protection argument is found in recent literature on the "right to 
treatment" for children institutionalized for purportedly rehabilitative purposes. See 
Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Syn- 
thesis of Paradox, 16 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 182 (1971); Pyfer, The Juvenile's Right to Receive 
Treatment, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 279 (1972); Comment, Persons in Need of Supervison: Is There 
a Constitutional Right to Treatment?, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624 (1973). 
44. This is a conclusion of the REPORT OF THE CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESSES 30-31 (1971): 
[Tlhere is no significant evidence that the juvenile court's beyond-control ju- 
risdiction has been effective in turning runaways, truants, promiscuous girls or 
other incorrigibles into the kind of children whose behavior patterns satisfy 
adult expectations. There is even less evidence that [CAL. WELF. & INST'NS 
CODE] Section 601 has produced happier, healthier children who go on to be- 
come better adults because of their court, probationary or institutional experi- 
ence. Time after time, during its hearings on the subject, members of the Com- 
mittee asked witnesses appearing on behalf of Section 601 for proof that any 
significant number of minors had ever benefited from its provisions. None was 
produced. Nor are there any studies, statistics or other evidence that even sug- 
gest such a conclusion. 
45. See Note, Ungouernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 1383, 
1394-97 (1974). 
46. If state support for parental authority is made too easily available, many of the 
values that flow from family autonomy may be undermined. See text accompanying notes 
99-100 infra. 
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status offense jurisdiction, then, has been both to discipline and 
to reform children who are not responding to the non-abusive 
discipline and correction of their parents. 
Juvenile law statutes are often explicit about the custody 
rights of parents as against the state and other outsiders. Califor- 
nia, for example, provides that only under certain limited circum- 
stances may a child be taken from his parents." With respect to 
"dependent" children (which include incorrigibles), the 
Washington juvenile court law provides that no such child 
shall be taken from the custody of its parent, parents, or legal 
guardian, without the consent of such parent, parents, or guard- 
ian . . . unless the court shall find that the welfare of said child 
requires that his custody shall be taken from said parent or 
guardian .48 
The well-established judicial attitude also provides that the 
right of parents to the custody of their children may be disturbed 
only in relatively extreme cases." Pro-parental policy, which is 
believed concomitantly to be in the child's best interest,50 dic- 
tates that state intervention would run counter to the state's 
objectives if the intervention came prior to the exhaustion of 
parental resources. 
The statutory language, history, and available case law 
indicate that Washington's incorrigibility law is a fairly typical 
47. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE g 726 (West 1972). 
48. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 13.04.140 (1962) (emphasis added). 
49. Most judicial expression on this point arises in cases where parental fitness is a t  
issue. In In re Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974), the court reversed a lower 
court decision permanently depriving a father of all parental rights: 
[A] parent's interest in the custody and control of minor children [is] a "sa- 
cred" right and recognized a t  common law. The Court of Appeals has character- 
ized the right of a parent to their [sic] child as "more precious to many people 
than the right of life itself." 
84 Wash. 2d at  137, 524 P.2d at  908 (citation omitted). 
In In re Sego, 7 Wash. App. 457, 499 P.2d 881 (Div. 1, 1972), the court reversed a lower 
court decision permanently depriving a father of all parental rights where the father had 
been convicted of murdering the mother: 
The natural parent's right to the custody and control of his minor child is a 
"sacred right." It  is a right protected by the state and federal due process 
clauses. I t  is a right to be abridged only "for the most powerful reasons." 
7 Wash. App. a t  467, 499 P.2d at 887-88 (citations omitted). 
In normal incorrigibility or runaway cases, parental control is relinquished voluntarily 
or the evidence is strong enough that the parents choose not to contest the allegations 
against their child. 
50. See text accompanying notes 92-96 infra; Hafen, Children's Liberation and the 
New Egalitarianism-Some Reservations about Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605. 
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status offense statute? The comments of the juvenile court com- 
missioner in Snyder show his awareness that the case before him 
did not fall within the pattern contemplated by such a statutemS2 
The statute was not improperly invoked merely because the facts 
of the case did not fit squarely the definition of "incorrigibility," 
but because of the essential inapplicability of the policies behind 
status offenses generally.53 Thus, even if Washington had had a 
runaway or general PINS statute, the result reached in Snyder 
would have been questionable. 
The actions of the commissioner are understandable in light 
of the fact that he faced the very real possibility that, should he 
return Cynthia to the custody of her parents, she would eventu- 
ally end up in the juvenile court again under similar, and possibly 
aggravated, circumstances. But since there was insufficient proof 
that Cynthia actually " req~i red , "~~  rather than preferred, super- 
vision from someone other than her parents, Snyder was not a 
proper case to invoke the incorrigibility jurisdiction of the juve- 
nile court. 
B. Early Emancipation 
In its brief to the Supreme Court of Washington, the State 
suggested that Snyder presented particularly troubling questions 
because Washington had "no statute permitting early emancipa- 
tion? A typical early emancipation statute, however, is not 
likely to have affected the outcome of the case since the change 
in custody did not relieve Cynthia of any of the duties or disabili- 
ties of minority status. But because the custodial rights of her 
natural parents were temporarily terminated a t  her request, per- 
haps the case has some overtones of emancipation. 
pp--p  
51. Washington's incorrigibility provision was originally included as part of the defi- 
nition of delinquency. Law of Mar. 17, 1909, ch. 190, § 1, [I9091 Wash. Laws 668 
(amended 1911, repealed 1913). In 1913, a distinction was drawn between delinquent and 
dependent children, the incorrigibility provision being reclassified under the latter cate- 
gory. Law of Mar. 22, 1913, ch. 160, § l(11) & (12), [I9131 Wash. Laws 521 (amended 
1961). The statute applied in Snyder is almost identical to the 1913 statute. There is a 
paucity of case law invoking the incorrigibility statute in Washington, probably because 
most cases fall under the traditional delinquency and dependency headings. Existing 
cases reflect the traditional alignment of parent and state alleging incorrigibility, the child 
either denying it or contesting the constitutionality of the statute. The statute has with- 
stood several constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 
529 P.2d 1096 (1975). 
52. See text accompanying note 17 supra. 
53. Consider the statement of the Snyder juvenile court commissioner quoted in the 
text accompanying note 104 infra. 
54. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.140 (1962). 
55. Brief of State Respondent a t  12. 
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Early emancipation was a relatively rare phenomenon until 
the beginning of the 20th century, when the general trend toward 
protective legislation for children and other shifting attitudes 
combined to make the idea more a~ceptable.~' Although complete 
judicial emancipationJ7 has been possible (usually through an 
express or implied parent-child agreement, the marriage of the 
child, or his entry into the armed services), most cases have in- 
volved only partial emancipation from the traditional disabilities 
of 
Statutory (as distinguished from judicial) emancipation 
removes legal disabilities such as contractual incapacity from a 
minor. Some statutes relieve all minors below a certain age of 
specific disabilities. Others allow case-by-case treatment in an 
equitable proceeding in which the minor or his next friend peti- 
tions the court for emancipation. Very few states have such stat- 
utes, and all but two or three strictly require consent of the parent 
or guardian? 
Lack of parental consent has been held to constitute a failure 
of jurisdicti~n.~~ In general, "the utility of [early emancipation] 
statutes is limited by the restrictions placed on young people 
seeking to avail themselves of the procedures and by a judicial 
hostility toward emancipation reflected in the courts' strict con- 
struction of the statutes?l The parental consent requirement has 
been labeled "[plerhaps the most formidable impediment to 
obtaining a decree of emancipation."" One court justified the 
"impediment" in the following language: 
[Olur law does not favor the displacement of parental author- 
ity without the consent of the parents. . . . [Plarental control 
is the fundamental principle that  lies a t  the foundation of 
society . . . . 63 
56. See Katz, Schroeder & Sidman, Emancipating our Children-Coming of Legal 
Age in America, 7 FAMILY L.QM 211, 212-13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Katz]. See 
generally H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 8.3 (1968). 
57. Judicial emancipation has been defined as "the termination of certain rights and 
obligations attaching to the parent-child relationship during the child's minority." Katz, 
supra note 56, a t  214. 
58. Typically, the issue is raised in such contexts as attempts by minors to avoid the 
strictures of intrafamily tort immunity, claims to recover a minor's wages or damages for 
the loss of his services, and actions for child support. Id. at  219-27. 
59. At least two states do not appear to require parental consent. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 
9 38-109 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 9 92 (Supp. 1975). 
60. See Emancipation of Dupuy, 196 La. 439, 199 So. 384 (1940). 
61. Katz, supra note 56, a t  233. 
62. Id. at  234. 
63. Emancipation of Dupuy, 196 La. 439, 444, 446, 199 So. 384, 386 (1940). 
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Early emancipation procedures and practices, then, have not 
provided a general theory upon which a minor could initiate a 
termination of parental rights or otherwise be relieved of legal 
subjection to parental discipline. This is particularly true where, 
as in Snyder, parental consent is lacking. Furthermore, neither 
Cynthia nor the court seem to have sought her emancipation from 
minority status generally, but only the transfer of her custody 
from her natural parents to court-appointed foster parents. 
The case still leaves one wondering, however, what the 
court's attitude would be if it later appeared that Cynthia were 
unwilling to submit to the limitations on her hours and personal 
habits imposed either by the court or by her foster parents. The 
same reasoning that led to relieving her of the duty to obey her 
natural parents might well require that she be relieved of the duty 
to obey any substitute parents, since there was evidently nothing 
peculiar about what her parents asked of h e P 4  In that sense, 
perhaps the case does smack of a kind of emancipation. If so, it 
hints a t  a new judicial policy that would permit emancipation 
when the minor appears to be a mature adolescent and strongly 
prefers to be relieved of a duty to conform to parentally imposed 
discipline. 
The foregoing evaluation of Snyder in relation to existing 
juvenile law is presented not merely to criticize the findings of the 
juvenile court, but to establish that a minor's right to avoid the 
custody of legally fit natural parents is quite foreign to the prem- 
ises of current juvenile law. The continuing tradition of the juve- 
nile law relative to early emancipation and status offenses is 
scarcely compatible with a right of minors to terminate the cus- 
tody of their parents merely because they disagree with their 
parents' style of childrearing. 
111. PREMISES AND IMPLICATIONS OF Snyder 
Snyder's apparent lack of congruity with traditional juvenile 
law does not necessarily discredit the result. Indeed, there is a 
point of view from which the decision seems quite rational. Here 
was a young woman, 3 years shy of majority, who experienced 
nothing but conflict and misery in her home. She had a very 
different philosophy about the appropriateness of her behavior 
than did her parents. What she chose to do violated no law or 
community-wide standard of morality. Although her parents 
were not forcing her to accept strange or potentially harmful ideas 
64. See notes 123-25 and accompanying text infra. 
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or conduct, they were trying to impose upon her their personal 
value system against her will. Since she was purportedly mature 
and well informed and could a t  least seek guidance from other 
adults, she had no insurmountable need to look to her parents for 
physical or emotional protection and guidance. Under the law, 
then, she was apparently faced with the dilemma of either blindly 
obeying her parents or defiantly committing some act or series of 
acts that would give the juvenile court jurisdiction." Thus, her 
course of action was analogous to the decisions of many married 
adults who, because of serious differences in lifestyle preferences, 
petition the court for dissolution of their marriages. 
In the light most favorable to Cynthia Snyder, placing her in 
a foster home where she would be permitted to live more as she 
chose seems quite reasonable. And if, in order to reach this result, 
the juvenile court is faulted for stretching the concept of incorrigi- 
bility, that is no scathing indictment. Common law courts have 
often expanded prior rules and even statutes in order to achieve 
desirable results. Such a course of action is particularly under- 
standable for a juvenile court since it is charged with the discre- 
tionary role of helping youth and their families work out problems 
in the most practicable and reasonable way. While it is true that 
this discretionary role ordinarily arises only when the court is 
invited by parents to render assistance, or when the parents or 
children become serious risks to themselves or others, it is argu- 
ably fair to permit a teenager who is in the middle of a family 
crisis to invite and expect to receive the court's help. 
That view of Snyder has a certain internal rationality. But 
it proceeds from two related premises that have simply not been 
accepted by the vast majority of American courts. The first prem- 
ise is that when a serious parent-child disagreement arises, court 
supervision of discipline by legally fit parents is appropriate. The 
second is that children have a right to effect changes in their 
personal custody even when their parents meet all legal standards 
of parental fitness. Since the validity of the favorable view of 
Snyder rests upon these premises, they deserve some discussion. 
A. Court Supervision of the Conduct of Legally Fit Parents 
Although the legal fitness of the Snyders had already been 
65. The brief submitted to the state supreme court by Cynthia's attorney stated that 
giving her only these two options would place "the child in an impossible position" in 
which "the welfare of the child is not served, nor is the parent-child relationship strength- 
ened." Brief of Child Respondent at 7, In re Snyder, 85 Wash. 2d 182,532 P.2d 278 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Brief of Child Respondent]. 
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judicially established," the court, rather than focusing on Cyn- 
thia's conduct, focused increasingly on the reasons for her rebel- 
lion. The reasonableness of the demands made by her parents 
were therefore placed in issue.67 In stating the reasons for his 
finding of incorrigibility, the judge cited "a lack of consideration 
on the part of her parents."68 Although the unreasonableness of 
parental demands may help explain why a child is beyond con- 
trol, i t  does not prove loss of actual c~n t ro l~~- the  r al issue in 
incorrigibility cases. If Snyder is viewed as an attempt by a minor 
to defeat the custody of her parents, however, the inquiry into 
parental demands becomes understandable. Perhaps without 
fully realizing it, the commissioner tried the issue of whether Mr. 
and Mrs. Snyder somehow "deserved" to lose the custody of their 
daughter. In any.,event, there are serious legal and policy barriers 
to court supervision of the conduct of legally fit parents. 
1. Legal barriers 
The common law of the 19th century, both in England and 
in the United States, valued highly the right of parents to the 
custody of their children. Although modern observers often char- 
acterize the traditional common law custodial right as an interest 
in chattels,70 it is clear that a parent's legal interest in his children 
was considered to be broader than a property right alone. It was 
sometimes referred to as "sacred,"71 the father's knowledge of 
what was best for his children being a matter of "natural law."72 
Significantly, however, common law judges did not rely 
solely upon these abstract concepts, but employed the basic pol- 
66. 85 Wash. 2d a t ,  532 P.2d at 280. 
67. Very little about Cynthia's conduct was in dispute at the hearing. She had done 
some smoking and dating in violation of parental rules; she had left home to seek assis- 
tance from the juvenile court; and she maintained that she would not remain with her 
parents if sent back. These facts were uncontested. The hearing inquired more into the 
attitudes and practices of the parents. For example, the court seemed convinced that the 
Snyders were being unjustifiably persistent in their own defense. At one point, the judge 
said, "She is feeling that she is going to be in the home, exposed to, if not continually, a t  
least the possibility all of the time of your wanting to use something the counselor says to 
corroborate your own feelings about what is right and wrong and to reinforce your views 
toward her." Replied Mr. Snyder, "May I ask you a question? What in the world is wrong 
with that? That is really a parent's time-honored prerogative to raise their [sic] kids the 
way they should be raised." Record at 109. 
68. Id. a t  81. 
69. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra. 
70. For example, Poe v. Geritein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1975) states that the 
common law treated both infants and mature teenagers as "the property of their parents." 
71. E.g., Re Plomley, 47 L.T.R. (N.S.) 283, 284 (C.A. 1882). 
72. See In re Agar-Ellis, [I8831 24 Ch. D. 317, 338 (C.A.). 
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icy arguments in favor of parental custody that are commonly 
argued today. For example, in the leading English case of In re 
A g ~ r - E l l i s , ~ ~  decided in 1883, the court observed that the state 
was poorly qualified to perform the functions of a parent: 
Fancy the position of a child, with its father living, which the 
Court endeavours to bring up by judicial machinery, instead of 
leaving it to be brought up by parental care. Judicial machinery 
is quite inadequate to the task of educating children in this 
coun try.74 
The court was aware that  mere disagreement on childrearing 
practices was not a suitable standard for interventi~n. '~ It also 
recognized that children, as well as parents, could benefit under 
a parental rights do~trine. '~ Despite language that cast the par- 
ent's custodial right in near absolute terms," however, the court 
acknowledged that the custodial right of parents was not abso- 
lute, but could be interefered with because of unfitnes~. '~ 
The common law of parental rights has not remained un- 
changed during the last 100 years.79 Indeed, a great deal of legisla- 
tive and judicial action in this area has fostered what has been 
termed "the waning of parental rights?O The most visible prog- 
73. Id. (court upheld father's right to prohibit daughter from visiting or corresponding 
with mother). 
74. Id. a t  337. 
75. "[qt is not mere disagreement with the view taken by the father of his rights 
and the interests of his infant that can justify the Court in interfering. If that were not so 
we might be interfering all day and with every family." Id. a t  338. 
76. "[It] is for the general interest of families, and for the general interest of chil- c 
dren, and really for the interest of the particular infant, that the Court should not, except 
in very extreme cases, interfere with the discretion of the father . . . ." Id. a t  334. 
77. One court has stated: 
Appeals have been made to the principles of the law which have been settled 
for centuries. Those principles have never been called into question. One of 
those principles (and it is the prominent one) is, that this court, whatever be 
its authority or jurisdiction, has no right to interfere with the sacred right of a 
father over his own children. 
Re Plomley, 47 L.T.R. (N.S.) 284 (C.A. 1882). See also R. v. DeManneville, 102 Eng. Rep. 
1054 (1804); R. v. Greenhill, 111 Eng. Rep. 922 (2836). 
78. Intervention would be justified 
[a]s soon as it becomes obvious that the rights of the family are being abused 
to the detriment of the interests of the infant, [when] the father shews that he 
is no longer the natural guardian-that he has become an unnatural guard- 
ian-that he has perverted the ties of nature for the purpose of injustice and 
cruelty. 
In re Agar-Ellis, [I8831 24 Ch. D. 317, 338 (C.A.). 
79. In fact, In re Agar-Ellis has been condemned in dictum for its harshness. Hewer 
v. Bryant, [I9701 1 Q.B. 357, 369 (1969). 
80. See Hall, The Waning of Parental Rights, 31 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 248, 249 (1972). 
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ress has been made in the area of child abuse and neglect; legisla- 
tion designed to deal with these problems now exists in every 
state.R1 Significantly, it has not been the structure of the law that 
has changed as much as the definitions and emphases within the 
structure. That is, although broadened definitions of parental 
unfitness make it considerably easier today than 100 years ago for 
the state to take custody of a child, there remains the basic re- 
quirement that unfitness be found. Except for the juvenile 
delinquency-status offense jurisdi~tion,~~ there appear to be no 
legal categories under which legally fit parents may be deprived 
of the custody of their children against the parents' will." Rather, 
the general rule favoring parental custody continues to be reaf- 
firmed in both statutoryu4 and case law.g5 
In addition, lower courtg6 and Supreme Courtu cases suggest 
that the right of parents to the custody of their children may be 
of constitutional dimensions. The import of these decisions for 
the parent-child relationship is not clear, since courts have been 
primarily interested in the parent-state relationship where the 
preferences of the child were not in issue.gg In fact, the Supreme 
Court has made it clear that it has not attempted to analyze the 
"totality of the relationship of the minor and the State,"" which 
would almost necessarily involve a general statement on the legal 
parent-child relationship. A detailed analysis of the relevant Su- 
preme Court cases is beyond the scope of this comment. But these 
decisions appear to produce, a t  the very least, a strong parental 
rights tradition that parallels and reinforces the common law 
position.g0 
81. See Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAMILY L.Q. 1 
(1975). 
82. This jurisdictional grant has not been intended or used to allow a child to avoid 
the custody of fit parents. See text accompanying notes 31-53 supra. 
83. This assumes the absence of an interparent custody dispute. Also, there are other 
situations in which some deprivation of custody can occur even where the parents are 
legally fit. Compulsory education, for example, involves a partial infringement of parental 
custody, even where the parents are fit. 
84. See, e.g., notes 47-48 supra. 
85. See, e.g., People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 5e9, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952); 
In re Luscier, 84 Wash. 2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). 
86. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). 
87. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U S .  390 (1923). 
88. But see Justice Douglas' criticism of such analysis in his dissent in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U S .  205, 241-46 (1972). 
89. In re Gault, 387 U S .  1, 13 (1967). 
90. See Hafen, supra note 50, a t  632-37. 
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2. Policy barriers 
Substantial policy underpinnings for strong parental rights 
arise from the nature of contemporary American society. These 
underpinnings may be considered from the perspectives of the 
parent, the child, and the larger society. 
The activity of raising a family is heavily value-laden. The 
existence of a broad discretion in parents to express strongly felt 
preferences and values in the context of the family unit is consis- 
tent with our society's commitment not only to tolerating and 
protecting, but also to encouraging ideological diversity and free- 
d ~ m . ~ l  It is especially fitting to respect that freedom in the case 
of the rights of parents since reasonable men and women differ, 
often to great extremes, on the question of what constitutes opti- 
mal childrearing practices. This does not ignore the fact that a 
great many parents are inept, ill-informed, and in some ways 
unreasonable and incompetent. Not surprisingly, children of such 
parents, not to mention juvenile court personnel and social work- 
ers, are not enthusiastic about these poor qualities. But i t  is also 
true that children (and their advocates) are often vehemently 
unenthusiastic about the qualities of quite competent parents. 
That being the case, it would be improper to judge the merits of 
parental conduct by a standard that would reflect the particular 
values of the court or a segment of the community, rather than 
by standards of neglect or abuse. 
Distinct from the interests of the parents, it is argued that 
the welfare of the child is best served when parental discretion is 
left largely unfettered. Professor Michael Wald has pointed out 
that the state's inadequacy as a parent becomes an argument for 
preserving the autonomy of the natural parents in order to benefit 
the child: 
[Tlhere is substantial evidence that, except in cases involving 
very seriously harmed children, we are unable to improve a 
child's situation through coercive state intervention. In fact, 
under current practice, coercive intervention frequently results 
in placing a child in a more detrimental situation than he would 
91. This point is well made by Professor Michael Wald: 
Our political commitment to diversity of views, lifestyles, and freedom of 
religion is promoted by allowing families to raise children in a wide variety of 
living situations and with diverse childrearing patterns. It is unlikely that such 
diversity would be encouraged in state-run child-care programs, or in a system 
that held parents merely as trustees for their children. 
M. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic 
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992 (1975) (footnotes omitted). 
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be in without intervention. This is true whether intervention 
results in removal of the child from his home or "only" in man- 
dating that his parents accept services as a condition of contin- 
ued 
Reasoning from broader premises about the nature of positive law 
generally, legal philosopher Lon Fuller similarly suggests that 
"the intimate relations of marriage and parenthoodflg3 place the 
detailed regulation of parenthood beyond the capacity of the 
state. 
The authors of Beyond the Best Interests of the Childg4 favor 
a policy protecting parental autonomy not only because parental 
autonomy is probably the least detrimental alternative for the 
child, but also because children urgently need continuity in the 
parent-child relationship: "To safeguard the right of parents to 
raise their children as they see fit, free of government intrusion, 
except in cases of neglect and abandonment, is to safeguard each 
child's need for c~n t inu i ty . "~~  I t  is not only intervention in fact 
that can disrupt this continuity, but also the effect that the lurk- 
ing possibility of coercive intervention can have on parents, since 
many of the qualities essential to good parenthood, such as "par- 
ental tolerance, endurance, and devotion," are based upon the 
right to be "the undisputed sole possessor of the child and the 
supreme arbiter of his fate."g6 
Another argument, perhaps especially applicable to adoles- 
cents, focuses on the "right" of children to be subject to parental 
discipline. It is inherent in the concept of discipline that the one 
subject to i t  does not regard it as being in his or her interest. For 
that reason, an acceptance of the idea of discipline is practically 
synonymous with some degree of authoritarianism. Unless one 
rejects the idea that being subject to some restrictions and disci- 
92. Id. a t  993. Wald argues that the threshold for interruption of parental custody 
should be the occurrence of basic harms that society agrees will justify intervention. Id. 
93. Fuller writes that both enacted law and contractual law share 
an ineptitude for attempting anything like an internal regulation of the family. 
If a contract of the parties themselves is too blunt an instrument for shaping 
the affairs of a family, the same thing could be said with added emphasis if any 
attempt were made to impose detailed state-made regulations on the intimate 
relations of marriage and parenthood. 
Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J. JURIS. 1,33 (1969). Fuller exempts from 
his statement "such problems as child abuse, compulsory education, and the like." Id. a t  
33 n.28 (footnote omitted). 
94. J. Goldstein, A. Freud & A. Solnit, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
(1973). 
95. Id. a t  7. 
96. Id. a t  25. 
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pline can be a healthy part of a child's upbringing, some conces- 
sion in favor of parental authority is inescapable. State interven- 
tion that tends to weaken parental discipline or encourage its 
disregard by a child would thus not necessarily be a service to the 
child, even if welcomed by the child a t  the time i t  occurred. 
Finally, almost as a restatement of the arguments that both 
parental interests and the welfare of the child are protected by a 
strong parental rights doctrine, it has been concluded that society 
generally is also benefitted thereby. As one court has expressed 
it: 
Immemorially the family has been an important element of our 
civil society, one of the supports upon which our civilization has 
developed. Save as modified by the legislature, in domestic af- 
fairs the family has remained in law a self-governing entity, 
under the discipline and direction of the father as its head. . . . 
Anything that brings the child into conflict with the father or 
diminishes the father's authority or hampers him in its exercise 
is repugnant to the family e~tablishment.~' 
The peculiar role of the family arises because the family is a 
unique source of values essential to the maintenance of a demo- 
cratic system but which that system does not itself generate: 
In democratic theory as well as in practice, it is in the family 
that children are expected to learn the values and beliefs that 
democratic institutions later draw on to determine group direc- 
tions. The immensely important power of deciding about mat- 
ters of early socialization has been allocated to the family, not 
to the go~e rnmen t .~~  
Premature state intervention in a family dispute may under- 
cut the incentive for the family to resolve its problems internally. 
If the state intervenes too hastily, particularly when it is siding 
with one party or the other rather than encouraging voluntarily 
accepted counseling, the effect may be to increase rather than 
mitigate a family dispute.99 Intervening a t  the stage of mere 
97. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 132-33, 131 A. 198, 199 (1925). 
98. Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 
BOST. U.L. REV. 765, 773 (1973). 
99. The concern about aggravating rather than soothing a family conflict is involved 
in the widespread criticism of the premature use of status offense statutes generally, 
although in most cases the concern is with the state being too freely available as a weapon 
for the parents. See note 45 supra. Consider also this observation: 
Whatever motivates parents to bring their children before the court, the 
courtroom experience does not generally ameliorate existing animosities, despite 
the supposedly, "protective" nature of the proceeding. To the contrary, able 
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stated intentions, which is essentially what happened in Snyder, 
is especially risky since the intervention itself may be the most 
significant factor in moving intentions toward conduct. As stated 
by another court in a somewhat different context: 
It may well be suggested that a court of equity ought to 
interfere to prevent such a direful consequence as divorce or 
separation, rather than await the disruption of the marital rela- 
tionship. Our answer to this is that intervention, rather than 
preventing or healing a disruption, would quite likely serve as 
the spark to a smouldering fire.loO 
3. The state intervention in Snyder 
Snyder illustrates what tends to happen when the state pre- 
maturely becomes a major factor in a parent-child dispute. When 
the Snyders first took Cynthia to the Youth Service Center, they 
expected a brief "detention"lol that would reinforce their author- 
ity and discipline in her eyes. When the brief detention turned 
into extended periods during which they were deprived of cus- 
tody, they felt the state had encouraged their daughter's rebellion 
to her detriment in violation of their parental function.lo2 The 
caseworkers seem to have concluded within a matter of days that 
the child's view of the situation was the more reasonable. After 
that view did not prevail under the standards governing parental 
fitness and Cynthia returned for further help, the caseworkers 
continued to search for alternatives, leading to the novel applica- 
- 
defense attorneys become surrogate parents and necessarily proceed to "de- 
stroy" the natural parents verbally on cross-examination before the defendant- 
child. 
Stiller & Elder, supra note 39, a t  59. 
Snyder demonstrates that a defiant child, as well as an angry parent, is capable of 
misusing the incorrigibility jurisdiction. 
100. Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So. 2d 885, 889 (1959). 
101. Transcript of hearing on September 28, 1973 a t  20 (testimony of Cynthia's 
mother). Paul Snyder has indicated that he took Cynthia to the Youth Service Center to 
have a conference with one of the commissioners; however, the hearing was denied and 
the juvenile authorities took custody of Cnythia against her father's wishes. Telephone 
conversation with Paul Snyder, May 18, 1976. 
102. Typical of Mr. Snyder's comments to the juvenile court are the following: 
[Slhe . . . is convinced by her success in putting this over that she can in fact 
do as she pleases. When she is 18 she won't have the protection of this court, 
nor will she have the protection of the Department of Social and Health Serv- 
ices, nor foster parents nor anybody else, and she will not have learned that basic 
lesson that you cannot do as you please in a civilized society or any other one. 
. . . . 
Cindy's attitude has been progressively hardening in the time since this began 
and what you have given her is 60 days more of that process . . . . 
Record a t  116, 118. See also id. a t  62-64, 70. 
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tion of the incorrigibility statute. Without a thorough knowledge 
of the facts, it may be unfair to assume too much about whether 
the caseworkers' taking a position firm enough to encourage early 
litigation was premature. One is left with the impression, how- 
ever, that their sympathetic attitude toward a teenager's "rights" 
encouraged them to side with Cynthia early enough that they 
may have exacerbated the family's conflicts. Even the juvenile 
court's decision to invoke jurisdiction and terminate parental 
custody in order to avoid a threatened runaway may well have 
been premature. 
Both the caseworkers' activities and the court's rather ques- 
tionable conclusion about incorrigibility may have contributed 
materially to creating the very incorrigibility that they are 
charged to remedy or prevent. If this reading of Snyder is valid, 
the intervention by the state on Cynthia's "behalf," even though 
welcomed by her at the time, was in neither her nor her family's 
best interest. 
B. A Child's Right to Avoid the Custody of 
Legally Fit Parents: A Question of Capacity 
One of the arguments advanced by counsel for Cynthia be- 
fore the state supreme court was that "a child has a right inde- 
pendent of its parents to seek the assistance of the Juvenile Court 
Act and to have her custody determined by the Juvenile 
Court."'" This right, i t  is important to remember, was being 
asserted in a setting in which the parents had been found legally 
fit. The expected reaction to that argument from the traditional 
family law perspective was nicely set forth by the juvenile court 
commissioner in the early stages of his thinking about the case: 
I cannot believe that the function of this Court is to accommo- 
date a girl of this age, no matter how bright, well behaved in the 
past, who might see fit to simply declare on her own that she is 
incorrigible and thereby disassociate herself from her family, 
from her parents, who are making an. honest and genuine at- 
tempt, albeit I think sometimes a bit inflexible, to allow her to 
103. Brief of Child Respondent a t  2. A similar proposal is found in Foster & Freed, 
A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY L.Q. 343, 347 (1972): 
A child has a moral right and should have a legal right: 
. . . .  
8. To emancipation from the parent-child relationship when that relationship 
has broken down and the child has left home due to abuse, neglect, serious 
family conflict, or other sufficient cause and his best interests would be served 
by the termination of parental authority . . . . 
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grow up in a proper type of environment. That is their responsi- 
bility. I think it would be improper, as I have said before, for 
me to simply accommodate her by her just saying "I am incorri- 
gible and I want out." I do not think it works that way yet.lo4 
The doctrine upon which the commissioner's statement ulti- 
mately rests is one deeply imbedded in our legal system, namely 
that children are presumed to be incapable of exercising many of 
the rights enjoyed by adults. Under the common law inherited 
from England, the general rule was that "an infant [could] nei- 
ther aliene his lands nor do any legal act, nor make a deed, nor, 
indeed, any manner of contract that will bind him."lo5 In recent 
years, however, the presumption of legal incapacity has been lim- 
ited in various specific settings.lo6 But this is far from saying that 
the presumption itself has been abandoned. On the contrary, a t  
the heart of virtually all laws dealing specially with children is 
the premise that children lack the competence to make important 
judgments about their lives and conduct.lo7 
The presumption of incapacity of minors must answer to the 
criticism of all legal line drawing: it is "artificial and simplistic; 
it obscures the dramatic differences among children of different 
ages and the striking similarities between older children and 
adults."loR For this reason, several commentators are calling for a 
reversal of the presumption of incapacity.log Some, including the 
State of Washington in its Snyder brief,l1° interpret certain Su- 
preme Court decisions as having reversed the presumption, a t  
least with respect to the exercise of First Amendment rights? A 
careful reading of these cases, however, reveals that  they do not 
lead to such a conclusion.112 
104. Record at 82. 
105. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *465. 
106. For example, the Twenty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution has lowered the 
minimum voting age to 18 years, and many states allow minors to obtain certain forms of 
medical treatment without parental consent. See Katz, supra note 56, a t  238-39. 
107. This philosophy is reflected in such limitations as age restrictions on voting, on 
driving automobiles, and on the availability of certain kinds of entertainment. It also lies 
behind the rules in tort law applicable to child trespassers, the rule of voidability of 
contracts made by minors, and the structure and purpose of the entire juvenile court 
system. 
108. Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 489 (1973). 
109. See id.; R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974). 
110. This seems to be the import of the statement in Brief of State Respondent a t  23 
that: "The case of In re Gault . . . suggested, however, vaguely that children are autono- 
mous individuals, entitled to the same rights and privileges before the law as adults." 
111. See Note, Parental Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The 
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1008-09 (1975) (interpreting Goss, 
Tinker, Brown v.  Board of Education). 
112. See Hafen, supra note 50. Significantly, the Supreme Court has frequently indi- 
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Perhaps the threshold question in determining the viability 
of the presumption of incapacity (as contrasted with its extent) 
is whether the fundamental realities of the parent-child 
relationship are better reflected by its preservation than by its 
reversal. The question almost answers itself. As is most obvious 
during infancy, the capacities of children are severely limited. 
Were control of children's actions and choices not vested in par- 
ents, such control would necessarily come to rest with the state 
or some other third party. Responsible scholars recognize, of 
course, that if the presumption were reversed, exceptions would 
have to be made to the general rule granting full adult status to 
minors.l13 But even then, some advocate other than the parent 
might have to speak for the child where a choice would be likely 
to have "irreversible consequences" and a potential conflict of 
interests exists between parent and childY4 The child's interest 
is admittedly in jeopardy when a parent-child conflict of interests 
exists. But the thought of an "extrafamilial decision"l15 on such 
issues as, for example, whether to send a young child to a private, 
religious school is scarcely encouraging. What is ultimately a t  
stake in critical decisions about an individual's childhood is the 
question of what values shall be taught him. There is no reason 
to pretend that the state in any given case is capable of choosing 
better values than the parents. In fact, i t  has been suggested that 
the state is manifestly incapable of any such choice.l16 
Even with the presumption of incapacity intact, it has been 
argued that  state support of parental prerogatives constitutes 
cated that its decisions affecting children's rights have been narrowly focused on the issue 
before it, and that it has therefore not intended to affect the general validity of laws based 
on minority status. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U S .  113,165 n.67 (1973); McKeiver v. Pennsyl- 
vania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U S .  629, 636 (1968); In re 
Gault, 387 U S .  1, 13 (1967). 
113. E.g., "The abolition of minority . . . need not mean that children become full- 
fledged miniature adults before the law. Their substantive and procedural rights could 
still be limited or modified on the basis of supportable findings about needs and capacities 
a t  various ages." Rodham, supra note 108, a t  508. 
114. Id. a t  510. 
115. Id. See also P. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 
13 (1974). 
116. Referring specifically to the federal government, Professor Theodore Caplow has 
stated: 
The government is likely to corrupt the family whenever it attempts to improve 
i t  because it has no legitimate authority to set moral goals for individuals . . . . 
The government has not place from which to draw the moral sentiments that 
would make it possible for it to say anything meaningful on the subject. There 
is no breath to sound that voice. 
Caplow, The Loco Parent: Federal Policy and Family Life, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 709. 
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"state action."l17 This reasoning is dubious as long as the choices 
of the parent are presumed to be identical with the best interests 
of the child.lIR If, however, children were generally credited with 
adult legal capacity, any legal enforcement of parental choice in 
contravention of an expressed preference of the child would con- 
stitute state intervention into family life. Similarly, presuming 
that children are capable of exercising all constitutional rights 
would mean that "parental prerogatives . . . must yield to funda- 
mental rights of the child . . . ."l19 By this reasoning, public, 
law-regulated citizen-citizen and citizen-state relationships 
would be imposed upon the parent-child relationship, posing a 
fundamental threat to the concept of the family as a private, self- 
governing entity. 
It appears, then, that the law best deals with the presump- 
tion of incapacity of minors by accepting two basic ideas. The 
first is that the realities of the parent-child relationship require 
a preservation of the presumption itself, since the presumption 
reflects the initial, natural status of children beginning life al- 
most totally dependent on someone else for survival. Second, 
granting that the presumption must be limited, tailored, and 
made rebuttable to conform as far as possible to the actual capac- 
ities of children as they grow older, the ability of a child to express 
a preference is not synonymous with his ability to recognize his 
own best interest. Beyond the age of total physical dependence, 
there remains a need for someone to make decisions for the child, 
a t  least to some extent, until the proper age for emancipation.120 
The state seems more poorly equipped to be the final arbiter of 
value-laden choices of great consequence for the child than are 
legally fit parents, even if a potential parent-child conflict of 
interests exists. 
- - 
117. Note, supra note 111, at 1013. 
118. If the parent is presumed to speak for the child, it becomes pointless to find state 
action in the enforcement of what are constructively the child's own choices. Although this 
identity of interest has been criticized, see, e.g., dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.Sm 205, 24e (1972); Rodham, supra note 108, at 510, it is still 
applied in some contexts. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 544 P.2d 941, 944, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
805, 810 (1976) (mother who was granted custody of children in divorce action deemed to 
have spoken for children with respect to source of child support payments from father, 
although her choice was later shown not to have been in their best interests). 
119. State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 907, 530 P.2d 260, 264 (1975) (declaring 
unconstitutional a state statute making abortions performed on minors without consent 
of parent or legal guardian a criminal offense). See also Note, supra note 111, at 1017. 
120. As critics point out, this "proper age" may vary significantly among individuals. 
This is perhaps an argument for a revitalization of early emancipation laws, but it is a 
poor argument for reversing the presumption of incapacity itself. 
6591 STATUS OFFENSES AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 687 
The view of Snyder most favorable to Cynthia, and that 
argued by the State before the state supreme court, has curious 
implications for the presumption of incapacity of minors. With- 
out specifically dealing with the presumption per se, the State 
maintained that Cynthia's actual capacity was one of the major 
reasons she should be allowed to avoid the discipline of her par- 
ents. Cnythia was characterized as being, in contrast to most 
children involved in dependency cases, "a bright, capable, rela- 
tively mature young person who is, in fact, the initiator of the 
court proceedings and who has called on the court for assistance 
and support."121 Further, the State asserted that "it is precisely 
because Cynthia is bright and able that her act of leaving the 
home and her refusal to return home are significant in terms of 
the definition of an incorrigible dependent . . . . 7,122 
If Cynthia were mature and self-reliant enough to decide 
against her parents' particular style of childrearing, however, it 
is inconsistent that she should still remain subject to a similar 
degree of discipline from the juvenile court and her foster par- 
e n t ~ . " ~  While the State did not explicitly reject the presumption 
of incapacity,lu its position seems to have been that the presump- 
tion either should have been abandoned or was in fact rebutted 
as between Cynthia and her natural parents, but was still effec- 
tive as between Cynthia and her foster parents or the state.12s 
121. Brief of State Respondent at  22. 
122. Id. a t  10. 
123, In particular, the commissioner ordered that Cynthia refrain from smoking, one 
of her parents' requirements to which she objected. Record at  117. Were this a classic case 
of incorrigibility, i.e., ungovernable conduct, that would not be surprising. But the state 
conceded that it did 
not take issue with the implicit (if not express) assertion by petitioners that Nell 
and Paul Snyder are able to physically control Cynthia. When she is in the 
home, she does not smoke and she does not date. 
Brief of State Respondent at 10. 
124. But see Brief of State Respondent at  23: 
The case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) was a landmark case not just in 
terms of constitutional law but also because it suggested, however vaguely, that 
children are autonomous individuals, entitled to the same rights and privileges 
before the law as adults. 
125. From a remark in the State's brief, one wonders whether the State would have 
liked to emancipate Cynthia. "The present case . . . raises many troubling questions 
particularly in a jurisdiction such as ours which has no statute permitting early emancipa- 
tion." Brief of State Respondent at  12. If this was indeed the State's objective, its position 
with respect to the capacity issue is not so paradoxical. But it does not appear that the 
contention of Cynthia or the State, either in the juvenile court or on appeal, was that she 
ought to be emancipated. Rather, the issue was whether custody should rest with the 
natural parents or with someone else. 
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C. Snyder on Appeal to the Supreme Court of Washington 
The Supreme Court of Washington identified as the only 
issue on appeal whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
the lower court's finding of in~orrigibi1ity.l~~ The court concluded 
that  there was sufficient evidence, although it expressly sup- 
ported that conclusion by referring to extra-record factslZ7 and by 
relying on the trial judge's opinion about the "weight" to be given 
Cynthia's testimony. The court did not deal with the notion that 
a child's defiant attitude, absent actual incorrigible behavior, 
cannot itself prove a loss of parental control but merely portends 
its future possibility.lZ8 
The court said disappointingly little about the broader ques- 
tions of policy, and essentially ignored the assumption of each 
party's brief that, rather than being a typical incorrigibility case, 
the litigation involved significant issues about the rights of mi- 
nors to choose their own lifestyles and en~ir0nments . l~~ The two 
brief references the court made to the policy of the incorrigibility 
statute and of the juvenile court fail to shed much light on the 
issues raised by the parties. First, the court noted that the "para- 
mount consideration, irrespective of the natural emotions in cases 
of this nature, must be the welfare of the child."130 A resort to this 
126. The court stated: "The sole issue presented by these facts is whether there is 
substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole, to support the juvenile court's 
determination that Cynthia Nell Snyder is incorrigible." 85 Wash. 2d a t ,  532 P.2d 
a t  280. 
127. In looking for the required pattern of disobedient behavior, the court considered 
the events connected with the hearing on parental fitness. These facts, however, were not 
found in the record before the court. The court also fdund "paramount importance," 85 
Wash. 2d a t ,  532 P.2d a t  281, in the opinion of a psychiatrist involved in the case. 
The psychiatrist, however, never testified a t  the hearing, and references to  his opinion 
entered the juvenile court record only after the finding of incorrigibility had been made 
and disposition was being discussed. Thus, the commissioner, himself, could not consider 
the psychiatrist's opinion in making his finding. Rather, he based his finding specifically 
on Cynthia's "announced intention and apparent resolve not to go home" and on "a lack 
of consideration on the part of the parents," Record a t  81, a t  the same time acknowledging 
that outside of these factors were "very compelling indications . . . contrary" to the 
finding. Id. 
128. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
129. Brief of State Respondent a t  10-11, for example, states that, "Cynthia Snyder 
is not a chattel and the test for control by the parents is not physical possession. . . . 
Cynthia . . . is a person who has apparently made a decision about her life." Elsewhere 
the brief ascribed to Gault the proposition that "children are autonomous individuals, 
entitled to the same rights and privileges before the law as adults." Id. a t  23. In Brief of 
Child Respondent a t  1-2, the state supreme court is told that it "will have to decide 
whether there are conditions under which a child may cause a change of custody," and 
whether "a child has a right independent of its parents to seek the assistance of the 
Juvenile Court Act and to have her custody determined by the Juvenile Court." 
130. 85 Wash. 2d a t ,  532 P.2d at  281. 
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maxim is of questionable value here, however, because the mean- 
ing of Cynthia's "welfare" was clouded by the issue of her rights 
against her parents.131 Second, the court recognized that 
the petitioner parents believe the juvenile court has given sym- 
pathy and support to Cynthia's problems in disregard of their 
rights as parents, and that the juvenile court has failed to as- 
sume its responsibility to assist in the resolution of the parents' 
problems with their minor ~ h i 1 d . l ~ ~  
The court found this contention "to be unsupported by the 
evidence,"133 pointing to the attempts by the juvenile court com- 
missioner to work out a reconciliation. " [ w e  are satisfied," the 
court continued, "that the juvenile court, in exercising its con- 
tinuing jurisdiction, will continue to review the progress of the 
parties to the end of a hoped for rec~nci l ia t ion ."~~~ 
In spite of the court's hopes, however, it was precisely the 
exercise by the juvenile court of its "continuing jurisdiction," 
construed by the court as a support for the parents, that was the 
basis of the parents' complaint. The alleged disregard of parental 
rights consisted of the lower court's refusal to relinquish its juris- 
diction when the facts did not constitute statutory incorrigibility. 
The court's implication that parental rights are to be protected 
is notable because, while it reflects the traditional perspective of 
the statutory policy, it is contrary to the holding in the case. 
Thus, the court's opinion gives no real explanation why the novel 
implications of the lower court decision were allowed to prevail 
over the traditional policy favoring parental rights. 
Upon seeing how the court restricted its inquiry to a narrow 
evidentiary issue and declined to confront the more fundamental 
questions that make the case noteworthy in the first place, one is 
tempted to conclude that the court committed an oversight; that 
131. The welfare of a child has traditionally been defined, at least in part, in terms 
of the care and protection that may not be denied by the parent in the proper exercise of 
his discretion: ". . . a child has no higher welfare than to be reared by a parent who loves 
him and who has not forfeited the right of custody." I n  re Faust, 239 Miss. 299, 307, 123 
So. 2d 218, 221 (1960). There had been a specific finding that  Cynthia's parents 
were legally fit, and there was no renewed allegation of unfitness in the incorrigibility 
proceeding. By affirming the finding of incorrigibility while purportedly being governed 
by the "welfare of the child," the court seems to have broadened the traditional meaning 
of a child's welfare to encompass the child's objections to his parents' discipline. If the 
court's decision is read as a statement that Cynthia's welfare was served by allowing her 
to avoid the custody of her parents, a redefinition of a child's "welfare" is implicit in the 
holding. 
132. 85 Wash. 2d at , 532 P.2d a t  282. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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it simply did not perceive the uniqueness of the case. This explan- 
ation is belied, however, by the briefs of the parties, where the 
significant policy questions were vigorously argued.l" Also, a t  the 
same time the decision in Snyder was under consideration, the 
Supreme Court of Washington was considering a relatively ex- 
treme extension of children's rights in State v. K ~ o m e , ' ~ ~  in which 
the court declared unconstitutional a criminal statute under 
which a physician was convicted for performing an abortion on a 
minor without the consent of her parent or legal guardian?' It 
seems unlikely that the court that decided Koome would not have 
been sensitive to the children's rights issues in Snyder. Koome 
suggests, therefore, that the Supreme Court of Washington may 
be taking a dim view of the traditional doctrines of parental rights 
and the legal incapacity of minors. If so, Koome may be a philo- 
sophical predecessor of Snyder, illuminating the willingness of 
the court to reach the latter decision. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Snyder was not an easy case for an appellate court. Realistic 
hopes for salvaging the parent-child relationship had been 
severely damaged by the nearly 2 years of proceedings that had 
occurred by the time the court rendered its opinion. Cynthia was 
almost 17, 1 year short of majority, when the court's decision was 
handed down. The troublesome legal questions could be glossed 
135. See note 129 supra. 
136. 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975). 
137. In a 5-4 decision, the court held that the statute, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. 5 
9.02.070 (Supp. 1975), infringed, without sufficient justification, on the constitutional 
right to privacy established by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). To extend the "funda- 
mental" rights found in Roe to minors, something the Supreme Court itself had declined 
to do, 410 U.S. a t  165 n.67, the Washington court found it necessary to assume that 
"[plrima facie, the constitutional rights of minors, including the right of privacy, are 
coextensive with those of adults," 84 Wash. 2d a t  9 ~ 4 , 5 3 0  P.2d at  263, and that "parental 
prerogatives . . . must yield to fundamental rights of the child . . . ." 84 Wash. 2d a t  
907, 530 P.2d at  264. In further holding that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated because women over 18 were not subject to a parental consent 
requirement, the court rejected the argument that the insufficient capacity of minors to 
make crucial decisions about their lives justified the age classification: 
In the case of the capacity to consent to abortion . . . [the] reasons for setting 
arbitrary age requirements are not present. The age of fertility provides a prac- 
tical minimum age requirement for consent to abortion, reducing the need for a 
legal one. 
84 Wash. 2d at  911, 530 P.2d a t  267. A careful reading of relevant Supreme Court cases 
reveals that the conclusions of the Koome court do not necessarily follow from those 
decisions. An analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this comment. For a discussion 
of the impact of Supreme Court cases on the question of abortions performed on minors 
see Hafen, supra note 50. 
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over by focusing on the evidentiary issue, so that the opinion 
would not seem to establish a precedent for the unusual proposi- 
tions being asserted. Moreover, the state's action was theoreti- 
cally only a temporary change of custody rather than a perma- 
nent termination of parental rights.138 For these reasons, perhaps 
the approach of the Washington court reveals a certain pragmatic 
soundness. 
One can no longer be sure, however, just what is meant in 
Washington by "incorrigibility." Because of the ambiguous treat- 
ment by the court, the role of Snyder as a legal precedent for 
children's rights is uncertain. Self-proclaimed incorrigibility, fos- 
tered by Snyder, may now be a viable option to children who 
reject their parents' discipline. 
Perhaps most significantly, Snyder suggests something 
about the sensitivity the government must possess in dealing with 
family relationships. No one really believes that the state should 
refrain completely from sustaining and adjusting these relation- 
ships. But when, as in Snyder, a family conflict arises-not from 
problems of abuse or neglect, but from disagreement about issues 
of values and parental authority-state intervention cannot be 
neutral as to those issues. Even without explicit judicial lan- 
guage, the result of government intervention can carry a distinct 
message. When the state shows a willingness to represent children 
against their parents in a case such as Snyder, and the courts are 
willing to acquiesce in, if not expressly endorse, that position, the 
practical result may be nearly as effective as an express judicial 
precedent in significantly altering the legal relationship between 
parent and child. 
138. Significantly, however, Cynthia never returned to her family home after the 
finding of incorrigibility. She has now turned 18, the age of majority in Washington. 
Cynthia's parents have filed a claim against the State of Washington for alienation of 
affection. Telephone conversation with Paul Snyder, May 5, 1976. 
